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Abstract. The European Union (EU) throughout its history has been the destination of diverse 
migratory flows. Therefore, migration has acquired special relevance by occupying a prominent position 
on the EU’s political, economic, cultural, and social agenda. The most recent migration crisis of 2015 
represents a multidimensional challenge with severe consequences that affect, first, the institutional 
foundations of the EU (governance, security, solidarity of member states and institutional stability) and, 
second, the migratory policies of receiving states and the EU itself. This crisis is characterized, first, 
by the high number of illegal migrants that cross the Mediterranean, and, second, by the humanitarian tragedy 
and insecurity, which make the sea a grey area and an international reference in the migratory processes. 
The migration-security equation became a field of applied research and analysis, and at the same time a focus 
of political debate and public opinion. The article aims at analysing the crisis of 2015 and its consequences, 
which is done by means of the methodological approach based on the consequences that this phenomenon 
entails for the EU and for certain member states. The response of the EU is limited primarily to securitization 
by strengthening the external borders, turning towards internal security rather than respecting international 
and Community Treaties and promotion of their values, which contradicts the anticipated leadership of this 
global actor. The authors believe that it is necessary to implement new mechanisms in addition to ensuring 
greater effectiveness of the existing ones. 
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The migratory processes are of special relevance for the international society 
in the 21st century because they affect social, political and cultural spheres of the states 
that are sending, receiving or transit countries for migrants. The current migration can be 
considered a mixed one: although its motivations are diverse (economic, political, etc.), 
there are the same access routes to the countries of destination, the same means of trans-
portation and the networks of traffickers to cross borders. What can be considered different 
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from previous migrations is that the current migration’s scope, complexity and the re-
sponse of states have changed. Moreover, the irregular immigration has intensified. 
In this context, various migratory crises in Europe since 2015 and their consequences 
pose one of the greatest challenges to the policies and institutions of the EU, highlighting 
their fragility and inability to perform collective actions. In short, there is a profound 
crisis of governance, in which migration plays a catalyst role. It is an issue that has 
occupied for years a relevant place in the EU policies, but not in the public opinion as was 
the case with the migratory crises determined by the Arab uprisings in 2011. Moreover, 
the governments of the EU states face migration challenges differently, without a joint 
strategy, which is perceived by some countries as a security threat and a challenge for 
institutional stability. Thus, receiving states strive to keep a difficult balance between 
national security, national and European legislation and principles of the international 
human rights as applied to migrants. 
The massive arrival of migrants to Lampedusa and their welcome made this island 
a symbol of solidarity. However, the uncontrolled increase of migrants, chaotic man-
agement and lack of clear answers from the EU reveal its weakness when facing this 
migratory challenge. The humanitarian tragedy caused by deaths, disappearances and 
insecurity make the Mediterranean a grey area in the migratory processes and a reference 
for both migration system and international disappearances (more than 20,000 recorded 
deaths in the Mediterranean from 2000 to June 2018; only in 2014, 75% of all migrants 
in the world died at sea). 
The EU’s migration policy is based on security as a combination of border control 
and rescue measures in addition to the fight against criminal organizations, which in fact 
opposes social and solidarity policies, neglects historical responsibility and normative 
system of values for Europe is increasingly fragmented. While there is a need to protect 
European borders from massive migrations, it is questionable whether the EU mecha-
nisms for the protection of borders, especially the southern ones, are effective. From 
the analytical point of view, there are several questions imposed by the EU-migrations 
equation: What are the security policies implemented by the EU? Is it possible to develop 
a different policy to control borders? Is migration one of the main concerns for the Euro-
pean public opinion? Is rejection of unregulated immigration a reaction to the potential 
loss of the welfare state supported by radical nationalist parties and movements? And, 
finally, do migratory flows constitute a challenge for the EU that cannot confront this 
transnational phenomenon? 
We focus on the position of the EU in the multidimensional crisis of 2015 deter-
mined, on the one hand, by the lack of leadership in the organization, of political will 
of the member states fearing the loss of sovereignty, and, on the other, by the inability 
to use sustainable collective mechanisms of cooperation due to prioritizing of securitiza-
tion by both the EU and partner states. Therefore, the study considers how the status quo 
of European partners responds to protectionist policies of national interests making 
migration complex a challenge for the EU and its migration policies. 
International migration is one of the greatest phenomena of the 21st century. 
In recent years, the numbers of migrants have tripled, and most of the states are involved 
in the exit, transit or reception of migrants, while only four decades ago 25 countries were 
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affected by the migratory dynamics. Classical theories of migration often consider it 
as linear and study only labour migration. The neoclassical approach influenced by Ernest 
Ravenstein [33] focuses on economic inequalities that affect personal motivation 
to emigrate in search for better living. Although these theories are questionable from 
the conceptual [2] and empirical [28] perspectives, they provide useful tools to analyse 
migration causes and effects [26]. New theories consider it as a part of global processes 
and social change. “New economic theories of migration continue to acknowledge 
the central role of (mainly economic) push and pull factors in determining the agency 
of individuals, but they also recognise the many intervening variables that facilitate and 
hinder migration. In these cases, migration research draws attention to the role played 
by the wider networks of family and friends who help migrants to move and to settle 
through financial and emotional support, and the middlemen, brokers, contractors and 
agencies that promote and facilitate migration”. World systems theory, on the contrary, 
“focuses more on wider systems than on individual agents. Here the world itself can be 
viewed critically as a single capitalist system in which poorer nations, the periphery, 
provide a constant supply of cheap labour to support the powerful and wealthy nations 
at the core of the system” [31]. 
There are several theories that can explain the migratory phenomenon in the 21st 
century. The most recent studies develop nonlinear concepts and frameworks, consider 
different types of migrants — for economic and other reasons, such as politics, religion 
and gender. Such an analysis focuses on globalization of migrations and uses such terms 
as transnationalism to explain crossing borders between nations. Migratory processes 
have special relevance for the international society for they affect social, political and 
cultural spheres of the states that are sending, receiving or transit countries for immi-
grants. “The volume, diversity, geographical scope and overall complexity of interna-
tional migrations have increased as part of globalization” [5] or rather due to the asym-
metric nature of globalization. 
From the theoretical perspective both globalization and internationalization are 
features of the international society that generate significant changes in it. Their dynamics 
affects domestic politics, international and social relations. Moreover, new problems 
transform the traditional interpretation of security — its conceptualization is no longer 
limited to military terms, it acquired a transpolar dimension: the threats to security or 
the “risk factors” became multidimensional and combined for they include traditional 
threats and new ones such as economic, environmental, terrorism, drug trafficking, 
transnational crime and mass migrations. All these threats were included into the 
expanded security agenda. Globalization and internationalization of migrations are 
classified as a security risk and a challenge for the recipient countries. In the academic 
field, the migration-security connection became the field of applied research and 
analysis, and it also entered political debates and public opinion agenda. 
Due to the new dimensions of migration in the Mediterranean since 2015, it is 
necessary address it with global and regional criteria similar to the EU. Receiving states 
strive to maintain a difficult balance between national security, national and EU legis-
lation and principles of the international human rights regime that protects migrants, 
which causes political tensions and violations of the EU policies and values. Today 
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migration is multifaceted and offers different levels of analysis, one of them is, certainly, 
direction and continuity of the migratory flows, and the neoclassical approach allows 
to identify how and why the EU reacts on the current migratory flows that cause 
an institutional-governance crisis. The close link between security and migration makes 
us apply the critical theory as a methodological framework for our study for security 
challenges are not an objective or independent reality. This theory allows to identify 
patterns of conduct resulting from political decisions that are “neither natural nor 
irrevocable or immutable” [27]. 
The critical theory’s normative ideological bias, i.e. the so-called ‘emancipatory 
pattern’, allows for changing the international system by not considering its variables 
or their actors as fixed. Therefore, as the perception of security is a socially constructed 
reality it depends on the context in which it originates and finds its legitimization. 
The School of Copenhagen, pioneer of the theory of securitization, claims that circum-
stances become issues of security not because they constitute per se a real threat 
to the state but because the affected actor “claims the right to manage the problem 
through extraordinary means” [8]. Security is beyond ordinary political games and 
requires exceptional measures. Considering the Mediterranean, its migration flows are 
considered as affecting the European security, as a threat, which fosters broad debates 
with a multifaceted approach to the challenge the UE faces. Under these systemic crises 
that affect institutions it is questionable whether they violate community, international 
and humanitarian law? Do they break interstate solidarity? Do they increase Euroscep-
ticism of European citizens? Has the fracture between the north and the south of the EU 
increased? Does the Visegrad group (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) 
adopt different positions compared to the rest of the community partners? 
Migration profiles of the crisis — 
from the east to the west of the Mediterranean 
The EU always positioned itself as a pole of migratory attraction due to its economic 
and development potential. Until the Single European Act (1986), each country managed 
migratory flows by itself, then, after introduction of a single market and the principle 
of free movement, the EU had to differentiate internal and extra-community movements. 
For instance, the Schengen Agreement made it possible to reinforce security by con-
trolling people at the border, facilitating domestic travel and strengthening external 
borders. 
With the migration crisis, three routes were identified [22] due to different that 
migrants encounter as a result of the states’ responses: the western Mediterranean route 
through which Moroccans and Algerians cross the Strait of Gibraltar to Cádiz and 
the Spanish Mediterranean coast; the central Mediterranean — from the Gulf of Guinea 
through Algeria, Tunisia or Libya, to Malta and Lampedusa, an island of 5,800 inhabit-
ants 205 km from Sicily and 113 km from Tunisia; the Eastern Mediterranean route 
to Greece. 
The Mediterranean-Italy connection as the point of arrival for migrants was estab-
lished after the Arab uprisings. From 11 to 14 of February 2011, 5,000 migrants from 
Tunisia arrived in Lampedusa, to which were added those fleeing from Libya. As a result, 
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Italy demands from the Frontex a joint operation called Hermes (February 20, 2011) 
to face this massive wave. The death of 300 migrants near the coast of Lampedusa 
in October 2013, in addition to the arrival of 40,000 immigrants in the same year and 
170,000 in 2014, exceeded all expectations and led to the activation of the Mare Nostrum 
device with a radius of up to 70,000 km2 in the Strait of Sicily with a monthly cost of nine 
million euros, which Italy cannot pay without the financial aid of the European partners. 
Mare Nostrum and previous joint operations will be replaced by the operation Triton 
(November 2014) supervised by the Frontex, and its monthly costs is about three million 
euros necessary to monitor the European maritime border. This operation will be replaced 
by Themis, whose mission is to repress the networks of traffickers and mafias in the 
Mediterranean. These securitization missions aimed at returning the migrants’ entries 
by sea to 2006 figures. 
From 2014 Italy and in particular the Island of Sicily has received the largest 
number of illegal migrants across the Mediterranean. In fact, “the route from North 
Africa had been providing this country with migrant labor, since at least the 1990s, but 
the agreement between Italy and Libya in 2010 restricted that labor supply” [6]. Illegal 
immigration by sea is often an alternative to the lack of other migration options, even 
though it is risky. For instance, only in 2015, 3,771 people died at sea [23], almost 
700 migrants — at 120 miles from Lampedusa, The European Council (April 26, 2015) 
believes that “Europe needs a balanced approach to the phenomenon of migration, which 
is comprehensive from the geographical point of view and is based on solidarity and 
responsibility” [15], and adopted two measures to deal with the causes of this crisis: 
cooperation with the countries of origin and transit and struggle with the immigrant 
trafficking networks (90% of migrants and refugees use organized crime networks and 
human traffickers to reach the European area) [21]. In 2015, the networks dedicated 
to the traffic of migrants earned between 4,700 and 5,700 million euros [20]. 
At the eastern Mediterranean route, Greece is the main destination due to its 
geographical location. Despite the economic crisis, Greece remains a point of transit 
for immigrants: before “the Arab uprisings, Greece was already by far the country that 
endured greater migratory pressure, accumulating 86% of what the Frontex Agency 
denominates illegal crossings of all the EU. For example, in 2010 there were 55,700 illegal 
immigrants who accessed the EU through the eastern Mediterranean route, a figure that 
rose to 57,000 in 2011” [34]. In 2015, Greece received migrants from Syria, Eritrea, Iraq, 
Libya and Afghanistan through the maritime or Greek-Turkish border, and migrants 
aimed at accessing the route of the Western Balkans to reach Germany and the Nordic 
countries of the EU as final destination. Therefore, more than 853,650 migrants arrived 
to Greece, “56.1% of people who entered Greece that year originated from Syria, fol-
lowed by Afghanistan (24.4%), Iraq (10.3%), Pakistan (2.7%) and Somalia (0.5%)” [36]. 
Before the massive arrival at the Balkan route, the Hungarian government unilaterally 
suspended the Dublin III Regulation for two reasons: the “protection of national interest” 
and “technical reasons”. Initially, this decision was criticized by Germany that opened 
its borders to welcome more refugees than it promised and suggested a new system 
of quotas. The negative response from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and 
Romania demonstrated a community fracture putting at risk the Schengen Agreement, 
which forced Germany to readjust its policy and suspend the application of Dublin III. 
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Given the risk of “renationalization” of migration policy, the European migration leads 
to the security crisis. Due to the closure of borders, in addition to the European Union-
Turkey agreement, the route through Greece used mainly by Syrians and Afghans, is 
no longer a preferred option. Since 2016, there has been a decrease in the flow of mi-
grants due to the impossibility to use the traditional route of the Western Balkans. 
Under the pressure of migration crises in Greece and Italy, the EU promised to 
relocate 22,500 refugees in 2016, settled in the camps of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, 
but finally resettled only 5,657, because the member countries of the former Soviet 
sphere agreed to receive a minimum number of refugees [11]. The European Council 
demands that the member countries relocate 63,000 migrants from Greece, reached only 
the promise to resettle 2,943, of which only 530 were finally resettled. As for those from 
Italy, the European Council requests the relocation of 34,953 refugees, while the member 
countries agreed only on 1,573 and relocated de facto only 615 [11]. 
The restrictive migration policy affecting the central and eastern routes of the Medi-
terranean reactivated the western route — its volume of migration tripled in the first half 
of 2018 compared to 2017 [24], with the migration profile of 75% men, 10% women 
and 15% of minors including a high share of unaccompanied minors [29; 30]. The 
summer of 2018 represents a change in the migration to Spain through the Mediterranean 
across the Alboran Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar, reaching record figures compared 
to other European countries. A smaller part of migrants reaches the borders of Ceuta 
and Melilla and then also the Spanish borders. The strict border policy of Algeria, whose 
coasts are 250 km from Almeria, makes migrants from Libya and Tunisia to seek alter-
native routes to reach Europe through Morocco that uses migratory flows in the foreign 
policy with Spain and the EU, being more or less permissive with migrants and their 
departure according to its own interests concerning fishing, air, association or the West-
ern Sahara agreements that have a direct impact on the border gates. The tense relations 
on emigration were affected by the EU Court of Justice decision to oblige Morocco 
to modify agreements on agriculture and fishing so that no to let it take advantage of 
the natural resources of the Western Sahara. The European Commission adopts agree-
ments with Morocco to stop migratory flows to Spain — for 140 million euros, but this 
is less than what was received by other migrant-sending countries such as Libya 
(227 million euros compared to 17 million euros given to Morocco). This money is 
allocated for the purchase of materials for border control and directly for the Moroccan 
budget. Moreover, a commitment was made to provide a channel of dialogue and per-
manent assistance in the coming years [13]. With this measure, the EU seeks to stop 
the arrival of migrants to Spain, which in 2017—2018 recorded their highest number 
in Europe. 
Under the migratory crises, Spain shifted from the policy of greater border control 
to the policy of short-term actions, moving from a humanitarian action intended to 
provide a safe harbour for 630 migrants on board the rescue ship Aquarius towards 
a more severe immigration control policy, especially after the attack on the Ceuta border 
fence in the summer of 2018. This action revealed the contradictions at two levels — 
at the political level the Spanish government demonstrated an incoherent line of action, 
and, at the level of migration management it adopts expulsion measures without 
respecting legal procedures and considering the risks faced by migrants. 
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Responses of the European Union 
to the multilevel crisis 
There is a tendency to identify the migratory processes since the Arab uprisings 
as a migratory crisis and even the most severe one suffered by the European Union since 
the Second World War. However, there is a different approach based on data saying that 
it is only the events of 2015 that are a crisis. In fact, the EU faces a political rather 
migratory crisis: there is an obvious proliferation of toxic narratives against migrants 
that supports the negative perception of the phenomenon, encourages radical and 
nationalist parties to use the populist rhetoric with xenophobic and anti-immigration 
elements (Austria, Hungary, Poland, France, etc.). The crisis of refugees and migrants 
highlighted the fractures and weaknesses of the EU affecting both its institutions and 
member states: “this crisis put to risk essential achievements of the European integration 
such as the Schengen area that guarantees free movement, and the options of the EU 
as a credible, effective and legitimate international actor facing, in accordance with its 
principles and values, the scenario of conflict and instability that surrounds it” [35]. 
Therefore, this crisis represents a challenge to the European governance as well as 
to the key guiding principles, values and identity of the last half century. The scale 
of migration in the EU causes institutions and national governments to adopt a range 
of responses that combine operational-military, political-legal and economic-cooperative 
plans. Through these plans the EU intends to face the reality and not to neglect its 
responsibility as a global actor. The measures adopted aim at securitization of borders 
and outsourcing of migration management in the situation when it is difficult to distin-
guish between refugees and migratory flows. 
The European Commission implements the new European Agenda on Migration 
(May 13, 2015) [14] to boost the externalization of borders at the national, community 
and international levels. The Agenda [9] “emphasizes security aspects reinforcing the role 
of the European Border and Coast Agency, better known as Frontex, creating the Euro-
pean Coast Guard and enhancing all aspects related to cooperation with third countries 
for control purposes of immigration and the return of people. Among other issues, 
the Agenda proposes the creation of hotspots, defining them as emergency mechanisms 
to support states... The European Migration Agenda also mentions the relocation and 
resettlement programs for people in need of international protection, calling for solidarity 
between states and shared responsibility” [36]. The Agenda means a redefinition of 
migration policy with a security aspect and responds to emergency measures in four 
basic ways: reducing incentives for illegal immigration, border management, a strong 
common asylum policy, and a new legal immigration policy — in search for a “fair, 
solid and realistic” policy. For some states, the Agenda was too ambitious as they had 
to comply with European migration regulations, for other states rather too timid. 
Continuing with the securitization of borders, European countries created the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency in October 2016, with the mission of managing borders 
and guaranteeing security in the EU through an operational strategy of intervention. 
Also the EU works to reinforce the Frontex [12] with a permanent body of 10,000 
guards by 2027. 
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It is becoming increasingly common for states to consider that the sea a propitious 
area to extend borders and prevent migrants from arriving based on the argument is that 
“their international legal responsibilities do not apply when they operate outside their 
territory or their territorial waters, creating in essence an area where the rights of migrants 
are not protected and where it is difficult to supervise the actions of the states” [25]. 
The duty of assistance is a basic principle of international conventions on the sea, but 
the responsibility to protect the borders makes states implement measures to intercept 
migrants at sea depriving them of protection in accordance with the fundamental human 
rights These measures have two goals — to prevent migrants’ arrivals and to avoid 
a negative image in the public opinion. 
The arrival of migrants, mainly from Syria in 2015, multiplies the geopolitical and 
strategic value of Turkey as a buffer state, which explains the Agreement between the EU 
and Turkey in March 2016, which shows the inability of the EU and its member states 
to manage the humanitarian crisis. The aim of the EU-Turkey Agreement, according 
to the European Commission, is to discourage migration flows through the mafia business 
model [16]. This agreement establishes: the return of migrants in an irregular situation 
to Turkey together with those who denied the request for asylum prior to detention 
in the established centres. For every Syrian returned to Turkey the EU is to resettle 
a Syrian who requested asylum in Turkey [17]. This agreement benefits Turkey eco-
nomically and politically: Turkey received 245 million euros for 2014—2016, which 
was increased to 3,000 million euros and another 3,000 more in March 2016 to assist 
refugees. Moreover, the EU supports Turkey’s accession process to the EU, which 
dates back to the association agreement (1963) and more recently to the European 
Strategy for Turkey of 1998, which is slowed down mainly by Germany, Greece, Cyprus 
and France, claiming that Turkey violated the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ (civil rights, human 
rights and democracy) and that the Turkish regime is authoritarian. The EU also under-
takes to exempt Turkish citizens from visas to enter the member states, which constitutes 
the most notable measure of this EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan. 
Several institutions together with some EU governments questioned the legality 
of this agreement as violating International Law and International Humanitarian Law 
[37], and “emphasize the great contradiction that exists between the European Union 
that affirms in its Treaty to be a space of internal and external solidarity as well as in its 
migration policy but, with this Agreement and the aggravation of the humanitarian 
drama of this population, they show a clear inclination towards the construction of 
a fortress Europe that entails an authoritarian drift in the position of some community 
governments” [32]. Moreover, some analysts question Turkey as a safe country to receive 
migrants returned from the EU based on the European Union Directive 2013/32/EU, 
according to which a person can only be remitted to a “third safe country”. Article 38 
mentions legal requirements for a country to be considered safe [18]: “people who were 
readmitted from Greece to Turkey under the Greece-Turkey Readmission Agreement 
after the 18 March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement face particular obstacles to international 
protection. Their access to asylum is very limited yet Turkish authorities justify limiting 
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their access to asylum in Turkey on the basis that readmitted migrants already had 
an opportunity to seek asylum in Greece. This has created a vacuum for persons who 
are in need of international protection” [37]. 
Thus, with this outsourcing policy, refugees become “the bargaining chip of a nego-
tiation, from which the Turkish side has tried to gain geopolitical and electoral ad-
vantages and the European side has prioritized needs of short-term security rather than 
the requirements of protection and rights” [35]. This agreement had a direct effect 
on the number of arrivals of migrants to Greece, which have decreased along the tradi-
tional routes, but at the same it has reinforced the use of more dangerous routes to the 
central and western Mediterranean [38]. 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, different instruments have been adopted 
for third countries “grouped under the rubric of the EU Global Approach on Mobility. 
These included the creation of mobility alliances with more favoured third countries; 
the maintenance of a long-term (albeit rather stagnant) dialogue with the Euro-Medi-
terranean region (the Rabat Process); and a considerable spending of political capital 
on the development of EU readmission agreements with the main transit and sending 
countries for migrants” [4]. These initiatives have not achieved the expected scope yet 
for the agreements focused more on reactive measures rather than preventive ones. 
Under the current migration crisis various efforts were revitalized through regional 
and sub-regional initiatives, although the issue of migration in the relationship with 
third parties was not a priority at first. In the framework of the Rabat agreements, the 
Valletta Summit was held in November 2015, at which the action plan was adopted 
with the following objectives: “to address the real root causes of underdevelopment and 
poverty which are the matrix of irregular migration and forced displacement; strengthen 
cooperation on legal migration and mobility to prevent irregular movements; strengthen 
the protection of migrants and asylum seekers; prevent and combat irregular migration, 
smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human beings; collaborate more closely 
to improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration” [10]. The EU also made 
economic commitments through foreign aid to prevent migrants and refugees from 
accessing the EU: a minimum agreement was adopted to strengthen the EU’s relations 
with countries of origin and transit, especially with Libya, by increasing financial support 
and reinforcing the agreement with Turkey. 
A crisis of the EU governance? 
The lack of leadership, both internal and external, does not contribute to the EU 
policies, which is proved by its “inability to be equipped with instruments to carry out 
effectively and coherently the principle of internal and external solidarity that embodies 
the preamble of the Treaty on European Union wherein the crisis of the displaced and 
refugees is just another test — the most significant one — of the ‘downward’ situation 
in which the integration process is found” [32]. The crisis shows that the EU system 
of border control, asylum and immigration does not respond effectively to these massive, 
unforeseen, heterogeneous and complex movements. The EU is not able to adopt a com-
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mon policy on migration. The national interests as prior to the community interests 
created an institutional gap that affects the governance, institutions and citizens and 
questions the solidary base of the EU and its achievements. The EU migration man-
agement covers three areas: “the mobility of people from member countries in the EU, 
migrations from third countries and, finally, reception of refugees and asylum seekers. 
These are three branches that have evolved as autonomous political areas within the EU 
and respond to differentiated political logics” [1]. The migration crisis creates tensions 
in the EU functioning due to the variety of its causes, diversity of ideological positions 
and disparity of national interests that complicate decision making. 
The short-term policies adopted by the EU did not help, nor the “check-book 
policy” that implies economic investments so that third countries act as a barrier 
to prevent migrants from reaching Europe. These measures led to the reorganization 
of the routes and more business for migrant mafias. Although in 2011 European citizens 
were more concerned about the economic situation and unemployment, the data of the 
Eurobarometers in 2015 indicate that the migratory issue is a serious and growing con-
cern — 72% of Europeans want the EU to intervene more in migratory management [19]. 
Illegal immigration and the Mediterranean crisis became sensitive topics for national 
public polls. European citizens became aware of what the massive arrival of migrants 
entails through the media that show impressive images of the humanitarian crisis that 
affects the EU institutions, member countries and population. Therefore, the question is: 
what should Europe do with the uncontrolled flows of migration? 
Moreover, migration acts as a common denominator in the nationalist and xeno-
phobic discourse of populist parties that try “to capitalize on the triple fear of immigra-
tion that nests in some segments of societies: fear of erosion of national identity and 
traditional values, fear of deterioration of the social-economic position and thinning 
of the welfare state; and security fears aggravated by the attacks of international terrorism 
that are associated with immigration” [3]. Nationalist parties and political movements 
developed a conservative extremist rhetoric, in which the migratory phenomenon is 
responsible for all bad things. In addition, the Eurosceptic facet is reinforced by the op-
position to the measures implemented by the EU. 
Although the populist term leads to a terminological confusion as meaning hetero-
geneous parties and movements, in the European context it is always linked to anti-
immigration and anti-EU parties. The ideological weakness of populisms allows to use 
it by both left and right parties. The crisis of governance that Lampedusa triggered and 
that remains open and unresolved, spreads to other countries on the southern shore 
of the EU and contributes to the fear of the massive arrival of migrants, which, in turn, 
supports xenophobic movements and extremist parties in the EU countries such as Golden 
Dawn in Greece, Alternative for Germany (AfD), UK Independence Party (UKIP), 
FPO in Austria, Danish People’s Party, Party for Freedom (PVV) in Holland, Flemish 
Interest in Belgium; Finns Party (formerly True Finns) in Finland, Law and Justice 
in Poland, Five Star Movement and Northern League in Italy. 
Although the EU is considered a normative power based on values, the migratory 
crisis shows that national interests are prior to the common European project, which 
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questions the integration process. In part, this is due to the crisis of governance and 
leadership, in part — to the diluted identity and internal fracture. Among the challenges 
that the EU faces is reconfiguration and effective harmonization of various policies that 
affect the migratory phenomenon. One of the priorities should be adequate responses 
to migratory flows, which combine securitization of borders and aid to the European 
recipient countries with economic endowment and operational support to third countries. 
All this would mean a sustainable paradigmatic shift in migration management — 
a move from a reactive police to the proactive one, which will test the effectiveness 
and unity of the European Union as a global player. 
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Миграционный кризис в Средиземноморье: 
многомерный вызов для Европейского Союза* 
К. Анкита Ольмедо, П. Гонсалес Гомес дель Миньо 
Университет Комплутенсе 
Факультет политологии и социологии, Кампус де Сомосагуас, 
28223, Позуэло де Аларсон, Мадрид, Испания 
(e-mail: canguita@ucm.es; pagonzal@ucm.es). 
На протяжении всей своей истории Европейский Союз (ЕС) всегда был центром притяжения 
разнообразных миграционных потоков. Соответственно, миграция стала предельно важной темой 
в политической, культурной и социальной повестке ЕС, в значительной степени определяя его 
позицию в каждой из этих сфер. Последний миграционный кризис, начавшийся в 2015 году, стал 
многомерным вызовом для ЕС с жесточайшими последствиями, которые сказались и на инсти-
туциональных основаниях самого ЕС (управление, безопасность, солидарность стран-членов 
и институциональная стабильность), и на миграционной политике принимающих стран и ЕС. 
Нынешний миграционный кризис, характеризуется, во-первых, огромным и все возрастающим 
числом нелегальных мигрантов, которые перебираются в Европу через Средиземноморье, во-вторых, 
прежде невиданными масштабами гуманитарной катастрофы и отсутствия безопасности, которые 
превратили Средиземное море, по сути, в серую зону и фокус всех мировых дискуссий о миграци-
онных процессах. Соотношение понятий миграции и безопасности стало предметом прикладных 
исследований и теоретического анализа и одновременно находится в центре политических дебатов 
и общественных дискуссий. В статье рассматривается миграционный кризис 2015 года и последствия, 
которые он несет для ЕС и тех его стран-членов, которые в наибольшей степени вовлечены в мигра-
ционные процессы. Авторы считают, что реакция ЕС на миграционный кризис оказалась преиму-
щественно сведена к политике обеспечения безопасности посредством усиления внешних границ 
и поддержки внутренней безопасности, вместо того чтобы выполнять международные и собственные 
соглашения и продвигать общеевропейские ценности, поэтому избранный ЕС курс на решение 
миграционного кризиса явно противоречит тому, чего от него ждут как от глобального игрока. 
Авторы делают вывод, что сегодня необходимы новые механизмы решения миграционных проблем 
наряду с повышением эффективности уже имеющихся. 
Ключевые слова: международная миграция; Европейский Союз; политика обеспечения 
безопасности; управление кризисом; руководство; Средиземноморье 
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